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I. Introduction
The metaphysical representation of reality is one of the problems in discussions on the philosophy of time. Presentism1 attempts to address this problem, and this brings forward a typical challenge. This 
is succinctly put by Simon Keller’s view of presentism as,
1 Thomas M. Crisp, “On Presentism and Triviality,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, 15-
20, ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16. 
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[…] the belief that only present things exist. If something doesn’t 
exist now, says the presentist, then it doesn’t exist at all.2
There seems to be an assumption that things do exist in the present. However, 
such commitment does not sufficiently explain the ontological persistence or 
otherwise of things when the present is not present or no longer present, as 
regards the truth of past events or things. This commitment can be said to be 
the basis of the distinction that Tallant and Ingram made of the two factions 
of presentists.3
Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, posting 
presently existing truthmakers for truths about the past; nefarious 
presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language 
of truthmaker theory but without paying any ontological price.4
The interaction of time and reality is at the center of the debate on presentism. 
Due to there being an assumed ontological implication that presentism 
points at, not of the present but of events or actions that can be said to have 
happened in the past but referred to  the present. The link between accepting 
the existence of a temporal part (present) and the events that have that part 
as their spatio-temporal reference creates a hub of debate among presentists5 
and this raises a lot of issues not just in metaphysics but in other areas of 
philosophical discourse. Tallant and Ingram take a challenging position on 
this issue as presentists in their own right. For them, the requisite status of a 
presentist properly so-called should be of commitment to the reality of the 
present exclusively, rather than a commitment to establish the ontology of 
events in other spatio-temporal parts, such as the past and the future.6 
II. Nefarious Presentism 
The basis for the debate between the upstanding presentists and the nefarious 
presentists is about the establishing or justification of temporal ontology 
2 Simon Keller, “Presentism and Truthmaking,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, 83-
104, ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 84.
3 Jonathan Tallant, and David Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 65, 
no. 260 (2015): 355.
4 Ibid., 355.
5 Neil McKinnon, “Characterising Presentism,” in  New Papers on the Present: Focus on Pre-
sentism, 13-30, eds. Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller, and Giuliano Torrengo (München: Philoso-
phia, 2013): 14. 
6 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 356.
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in talking about spatio-temporal events in the presentists’ language.7 
Upstanding presentism is the view that there is a means of providing 
the ontological ground required for the truth of propositions about the 
past.8 This view intends to solve the problem of temporal ontology in the 
presentists’ language by attempting to provide truthmakers regarding past 
events.9 
On the other hand, nefarious presentism holds that the presentists’ 
language can strictly quantify over present things and also that events 
which are no more in the present or not yet in the present are translatable. 
Such present tense quantification, with no commitment whatsoever to 
the actual existence of those events that are not available, satisfies the 
requirement of temporal ontology for a translation.10 In other words, 
the problem of temporal ontology seems not of grave concern to the 
nefarious presentist. Although Matt Farr suggests that the question of 
temporal ontology in presentism can be addressed by admitting an entirely 
different opinion from presentism (that is, eternalism), his view makes clear 
the problem that beset the nefarious presentist.11 For Farr, the discourse 
on temporal ontology is faced with the problem of triviality as Matt Farr 
notes.12 It is quite obvious that Jonathan Tallant and David Ingram intend 
to avoid this problem headlong by prescribing that all presentists should 
be nefarious presentists.13 Thus, the question arises on how to ground the 
truth of statements that exhibit spatio-temporal ontology and parts about 
events. For both the upstanding presentists and the nefarious presentists, 
the truth of presently existing events is taken as granted, given their basic 
claim that only present things exist. However, the crux of the matter is 
how to put forward the truth of past and future events in the presentists’ 
language, such that it is backed by the truthmaker which can be referred to 
actual existence and at the same time can be quantified in the present. That 
is, grounding the truths of statements where the truthmaker is not present 
but can be justifiably referred to as giving support to the language of the 
present. Keller succinctly puts the problem thus:
7 Theodore Sider, “Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology,” Mind 115, no. 457 (2006): 79.
8 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 356-357.
9 Ibid., 356.
10 Ibid. 
11 Matt Farr, “Temporal Ontology in Perspective,” accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.mat-
tfarr.co.uk/files/theme/top.pdf.
12 Ibid.
13 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 356-357.
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The problem is how there can be past- and future tensed truths 
though the past and future do not exist […] the presentist can 
avoid the problem only if she endorses some very controversial 
metaphysical views. While the truthmaking problem (as I will 
call it) does not stand as a refutation of presentism, it does show 
that presentism comes at a price. Whether or not presentism 
is plausible depends upon whether or not that price is worth 
paying.14
We can say that the price to be paid that Keller alludes to is what Tallant and 
Ingram point at, which is, the jettisoning of ontological commitment by the 
presentist. This view is mostly a non-commitment to the temporal ontology 
of events that are not presently existing but are rendered in the presentists’ 
language. 
The range of responses offered by presentists to the truthmaker 
objection suggests another possible response. Some presentists 
look to deploy “in virtue of language,” without making any 
ontological commitments. They deny the premise (All truths 
require truthmakers i.e. “ontological grounds”). They tell us 
that there were dinosaurs is true because there were dinosaurs, 
where that claim is not one that commits us to the existence 
of anything in the past or present. More, they say that there 
were dinosaurs is true in virtue of there having been dinosaurs. 
Following a position I’ve argued with David Ingram call this 
a “nefarious” response to the truthmaker objection. If that 
move can be made in response to the truthmaker objection (a 
significant “if”).15
The present tense quantification of a non-present event where the truthmaker 
is absent summarily presupposes the truth of the proposition about the 
event. Also, it justifies the temporal existence of the event. It does seem, 
however, that the position Tallant and Ingram take, gives a specific focus 
on the suggestion by Keller on the problem of ontological commitment as 
associated with truthmaking. For Keller, 
The truthmaking problem does not refute presentism, but it 
does leave the presentist with the twin burdens of choosing an 
14 Keller, 85.
15 Jonathan Tallant, “Presentism, Persistence and Trans-temporal Dependence,” Philosophical 
Studies 175 (2018): 2214.
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account of what underlies past and future-tensed truths and of 
showing that it is worth making the unattractive commitments 
that such an account will inevitably involve.16
Regarding the above statement, nefarious presentists will tend towards 
providing an account of truthmakers for past and future events as an 
unattractive commitment, as events as such are avoidable. As a philosophical 
system, truthmaking entails existence. The truth of a proposition entails 
that there must be a state of affairs that obtains or occurs as stated in the 
proposition. This means that what is true depends upon what exists.17 The 
possibility of having truthmakers that will justify the truth of past and future 
events for the nefarious presentist will be a futile effort. For instance, the 
truth of the proposition “Julius Caesar was a Roman Emperor” will require that 
there is an actual period when it was described as “Julius Caesar is the Roman 
Emperor.” However, that spatio-temporal ontology is no more captured in 
a state of affairs that presently exists, hence the nefarious presentists’ claim 
that there need not be an analysis of the past event in such a manner that 
will require analysis by truthmaking appears convincing. This shield from 
analysis, that nefarious presentists allow, seems to solve the problem of 
plural tensed statement and quantifiers. Properties of things do exist as they 
are being instantiated in the state of affairs that are experienced simply. It is 
the attempt to find an interconnectedness among various state of affairs and 
properties identified that make analysis challenging.
However, these properties are somewhat undeniable aspects of reality. 
Heil describes properties of things as “features of the world that make a 
difference in how objects behave or would behave.”18 In other words, the 
properties that are instantiated have a way of establishing the existence of 
an event in spatio-temporality. These properties, according to Heil, are such 
as science “teases out.” They are what “figures in the laws of nature, and 
laws govern the behaviour of objects.” As much as he notes that defining 
the properties of things as they are instantiated is problematic, it is evident 
that he regards properties as dispositional powers in their possessors.19 These 
properties could be referred to as causal or relational powers in the objects 
expressed in their interaction with the environment. Hence, for presentism, 
the properties of object exhibited are taken to be the truthmakers for the 
state of affairs in spatio-temporal ontology. There is a circular problem in this 
16 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 361. 
17 Ibid., 361.
18 John Heil, “Properties and Powers,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, 223-254, ed. 
Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 222.
19 Ibid., 225.
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view: if time is conceived “as a series of instants that are made out of events 
tied together by a relation of simultaneity, a different one for all instants,”20 
it implies that the properties of objects or events, as the case may be, are 
assumed in the spatio-temporal ontology where the truthmakers themselves 
have their source. By alluding to these temporal properties as an indicator of 
truthmakers, the ontology of non-present things is rendered as present truths. 
Still, it is in providing such a justification for an ontological commitment that 
the nefarious presentist turns away. Nefarious presentists argue that temporal 
properties do not suffice to provide truthmakers for the truth of non-present 
events.
According to Tallant and Ingram, the instantiation of temporal 
distributional properties does not admit of change as an existential fact.21 
By this, they imply that things in the past can be other than believed to 
be, or that which obtains. This argument is itself problematic considering 
that the events shift into the temporal part regarded as past are fixed. So 
also, when a temporal distributional property is instantiated, it is fixed 
and immutable.22 This means that for an event that exists presently, its 
temporal distributional property – as at that point is fixed and immutable, 
its spatio-temporal ontology, cannot be revised. When a thing or an event 
instantiates a property at time T1, that instantiation itself is a truthmaker, 
because it is established as a fact that is actual, the possibility of a change 
of that instantiation as at T1 is next to zero. Whatever change will occur 
about what is instantiated, will be fixed in another temporal location. This 
includes all properties involved, either they are causal or relational.
Temporal distributional properties (of being past, being present or 
being future) are introduced to address this challenge. For Ross Cameron, 
these TDPs are capable of change such that the instantiations in the instants 
of time do not in any way affect the grounding of truth they provide for 
entities.23 For instance, the property of age is correlative to the instantiation 
of TDPs, as of being-a-boy-then-being-a-man-then-being-an-old-man. The 
claim evident in Cameron’s argument is that movement (change) of along 
the line of TDPs, is also exhibited in the movement (change) in the property 
of age. Tallant and Ingram analyze this argument as a solution to the 
20 Jiri Benovsky, “Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of 
Primitives in Ontological Theories,” Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 
73, no. 1 (2010): 107. 
21 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 358. 
22 Ibid., 359-360. 
23 Ross Cameron, “Truthmaking for Presentists,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 6, 55-
100, eds. Karen Bennet, and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
58. 
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truthmaker problem, which will defeat the non-commitment of nefarious 
presentists to ontology:
To see how TDPs solve the truthmaker problem, consider the 
following (vastly simplified) example. Suppose that Ross is now 
a man and was a boy. “Ross was a boy” is true, but what makes it 
true? In Cameron’s metaphysic, Ross instantiates the TDP, being-
a-boy-then-being-a-man-then-being-an-old-man, and the age 
property. Notice that between them, the TDP and age property 
fix not only how Ross is now, but also how Ross was. Namely: 
a boy. Hence, the union of the TDP and the age property serves 
to make true “Ross was a boy,” and so we have a solution to the 
truthmaker problem.24
However, the idea of change, which was expressed by Tallant and Ingram 
is overly extravagant in addition to being vastly simplified, as suggested 
above. This is because it can be argued that the entity “man” has properties 
that may not be captured by the TDP and age property; properties that may 
be non-spatial and non-temporal that may be of essential instantiation to 
the beingness of man such as rationality, moods etc. The being-a-boy-then-
being-a-man-then-being-an-old-man TDP expresses a change in time and 
distributional property of the entity “man.” This, however, does not exclude 
“man” from the category of entities in which it is examined through the 
analysis of spatio-temporal ontology and truthmaking. Non-human objects, 
activities and events may well exhibit TDPs, that sometimes may be confined 
to the scope of space.
For instance, a cup placed on a table will maintain the same spatio-
temporal status except there is a change of events in its space-time boundary, 
such as being moved by another entity. In such case statement of fact about 
the cup changes. This is unlike the being-a-boy-being-a-man-being-an-old-
man idea of the TDP. But for Tallant and Ingram to posit the change in the 
property of entities or entities themselves is to fault the need of truthmakers 
for a statement about the present,25 since presently existing entities will have 
to remain so and as such. TDPs are of no consequence to the truthmaker 
problem in presentism, especially upstanding presentism. This will imply that 
presently existing entities are fixed in their spatio-temporal ontology, and 
this leads to the problem of triviality again. The statement “Phillip is the King 
of France now” with a state of affairs that is a truthmaker in the present, will 
remain fixed in the truth of the spatio-temporal ontology captured.
24 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 359. 
25 Ibid.
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The concept of hyper-change and hyper-time as put forward by Ross 
Cameron does little to address the challenge posed against presentism as 
regards the idea of change. The question of time and change as being jostled 
by the presentists is not straightened yet, and then the concept of hyper-
change and hyper-time which is pulled into the debate, only makes it more 
problematic.
As simple as it may sound, Tallant and Ingram conflate the idea of change 
and temporal location in their argument. A fixed event in the past is so, not 
because of the truthmaker involved, but because of the temporal location 
of its occurrence. The statement, “Phillip is the King of France now” will be 
banally false when rendered in the present where the truthmaker is fixed in 
the past. Furthermore, “Phillip was the King of France” will be problematic 
statement to analyze in reference to its spatio-temporal ontology because the 
truthmaker of these statements is not presently existing. Nefarious presentists 
avoid this problem due to the rejection of the distribution of properties over 
space and time. All the nefarious presentists will claim that “Phillip was the 
King of France” is fixed in the past as true, regarding the state of affairs 
that obtains for the statement to be to true. There is no strict necessitation 
between a proposition and the truthmaker in the present, when the temporal 
location of events is distributed beyond the scope of occurrence.26
Tallant and Ingram are of the view that presentists with a commitment to 
spatio-temporal ontology use necessitation loosely. For them,
It’s not merely the case that Caesar’s existence necessitates the 
future truth of “Caesar existed.” There is more to it than that. 
After all, the existence of any contingent existent (e.g. Queen 
Elizabeth’s left eyebrow, Pokemon, batteries, etc.) necessitates 
the future truth of “2+2=4.” But the relationship between Queen 
Elizabeth’s eyebrow and the truth of “2+2=4” is quite different 
from the way in which the existence of Caesar fixes that it will be 
the case Caesar existed (and “Caesar existed” will be true). Mere 
necessitation seems quite the wrong way to describe the nature 
of this fixing.27
The nature of fixing here cannot be one of mere necessitation but of strict 
necessitation. This allows the claim by nefarious presentists that truths 
regarding the past do not require an analysis of the present. However, strict 
necessitation, as they are true cannot apply because logical truths have 
no temporal boundaries. The truth of the arithmetic statement 2+2=4 is 
26 Ibid., 361.
27 Ibid.
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not bounded in a spatio-temporal ontology; its truth is fixed, while the 
contingent existent of Queen Elizabeth’s eyebrow is not fixed across time. 
We can argue that the relationship between the two objects will be of 
implication, not necessitation. That is, affirming that the truthmaker of a 
contingent existent is fixed, allows us to infer the necessity of logical truth 
in the future. However, the logical truth itself is not restricted by the scope 
of time.
This implies that the contingency of non-present events should allow 
for strict necessity; this is because the nature of fixing for the nefarious 
presentist is such that logical truths exhibit. Therefore, there is an 
interchange of the idea of necessitation and implication by the nefarious 
presentist.28 The upstanding presentist may argue that implication suffices 
to explain how the truth of non-present events is established by the fixed 
properties they instantiate. But this will not do well to address the idea of 
“fixing as necessitation” by the nefarious presentist. If presentists generally 
conceive of necessitation ab initio as strict as in logical necessity, the claim 
of upstanding presentists fails, since the truthmakers that will admit of the 
truth of a proposition about the present are of strict contingency. This is 
because if the upstanding presentist is to go the way of primitivism where 
tensed truths are unanalyzed,29 they might as well allow that mere necessity 
will suffice to provide an indication of truthmakers of the past statements, 
where truth about the past fixes or implies a truth about the present.
It, therefore, seems upstanding presentism does so much as to 
accommodate all experience in existence as regards temporal ontology and 
temporal location. But the attempt to give an inclusive existent to the spatio-
temporal category of the past about truthmakers drives presentism to the 
fundamental question; that is how can the propositions of the non-present 
be regarded as true given by the truthmakers for such events which are also 
non-present? The result is that the upstanding presentism is inevitable as 
long as their position is to retain any attraction. The denial of ontological 
commitment in nefarious presentism implies that propositions about the 
present can be made in terms that will not involve triviality or banality. But 
will this denial by nefarious presentists cover tensed propositions about the 
present as well as tenseless propositions? An assumption that comes with 
nefarious presentism is that all talk about the present is of a tenseless kind. 
In other words, the un-analyzability of statements without a commitment 
to ontology avoids the problems of triviality, but this is a direct plunge into 
the principles of primitivism. The truth of propositions about the present 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 356.
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need not be analyzed with the availability of truthmakers. If nefarious 
presentists hold this claim, then they also face the challenges that plague 
primitivism. 
III. The Un-analyzable Present, Thisness and Triviality 
Nefarious presentism as an adequate theory of temporal existence should be 
able to account for all the use of tenses in language. In other words, both 
tensed and tenseless quantification should be well explicated with the criteria 
that the nefarious presentists set out into their proposal. It should also be able 
to cover any range of quantification, either singular or plural. In combating 
the challenge of the truthmaker objection against presentism, nefarious 
presentists seem to have found a way to deny ontological commitment. 
A statement such as “There is a king named Charles” is understood in the 
tenseless sense may not be much of a problem to the nefarious presentist, 
even so, it faces the triviality problem. But by the extent of language use, 
will the appeal to un-analyzable truths explain tensed quantifiers, as in the 
instance of “There have been two kings named Charles?”
The principles that Tallant and Ingram endorse is that nefarious presentism 
should hold its consistent with primitivism.30 Primitivism holds that the truth 
about the events of the past, which are within the present in their scope of 
utterance, are simply un-analyzable. The move to analyze such statement will 
only be futile, since truthmakers for such entities are not located within the 
temporal scope of utterance. David Lewis explains two variants of primitivism 
as follows:
Version I. To be a quantifier is to function semantically like a 
quantifier. There must be a domain of entities, there must be a 
way for members of that domain to satisfy predicate phrases, and 
a quantifier phrase indicates whether some, or all, or none, or 
two, or infinitely many, or several, or […] things in the indicated 
domain satisfy a predicate. Since there are no domains of past 
or future things, “tensed quantifiers” are not really quantifiers.
Version II. To be a quantifier is to function inferentially like a 
quantifier. Tensed quantifiers are indeed quantifiers, because 
they obey (appropriately tensed forms of) the usual rules of 
quantificational logic. However, the usual semantic story about 
domains and satisfaction does not apply to them.31
30 Ibid., 361.
31 David Lewis, “Tensed Quantifiers,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, 3-14, ed. Dean 
W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 12.
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From Version I, tenseless statements are explicated semantically without the 
restriction of quantifiers. In other words, the quantification of spatio-temporal 
entities is the mere use of words. In Version II, quantifiers are inferential. 
They are intended to appear in the explication of spatio-temporal entities. 
Although Lewis argues that the distinction between these two versions is 
superficial, I think it is a genuine one. If nefarious presentists are to pick up 
the primitivists’ ambition of un-analyzability, especially the Version I., then it 
is evident in the move by Tallant and Ingram in laying out two principles of 
primitivism:
(1) Truths about the past are expressed using primitive (and 
analyzable) tense operator.
(2) The primitive (and unanalyzable) tense operators do not pick 
out some distinctive ontological category or aspect of reality.32
These two principles align with the view of primitivism as explicated by Lewis,33 
since they do not deny that tense operators indicate that there is a scope of 
time that needs explication in the presentists language even if the truthmaker 
is not present. However, as he notes, primitive tensed quantification requires 
a temporal analysis which the nefarious presentist will not be inclined to carry 
out, since this will run him into identifying temporal ontology of the past.
Thus, the nefarious presentist is left to give a presentist translation of non-
present truths with recourse to triviality (in this case where the truthmaker is 
presently existing). Ordinarily, the problem of triviality, as presented against 
the presentists, can be addressed with truthmakers for presently existing 
entities. For instance, one can argue that when the presentist says, “only 
present things exist now,” “only present things exist presently” and so on, it 
is implied that there is a truthmaker for the propositions of the present reality 
to be true. However, it takes a different turn with non-present reality. The 
language of the nefarious presentist allows the translation of non-present 
things in its non-present tense. For instance, “it was the case that p is true 
because it was the case that p.” The tense operator in this proposition “was” 
is presented bluntly as primitive and un-analyzed. This is a case of triviality in 
an obtrusive sense.
The past tensed quantifier needs analysis if it is to be rendered in a 
presentists’ language and avoid triviality that will arise from the camp of 
32 Tallant, and Ingram, “Nefarious Presentism,” 361.
33 Lewis, 12.
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the nefarious presentist.34 The nefarious presentist disregards this need for 
analysis. Howsoever, it is being determined, a translation of a proposition 
such as “There have been a king named Charles,” in a restricted domain of 
quantification which is the present, will have to be analyzed to arrive at being 
explained in the unrestricted domain of quantifications in the past or future. 
Consider the following supposed translations of the presentists following 
Lewis’ explication:
“There has been a king named John.”
(a) It has been that (There is a king named John).
(b) There has been a king named John because there was a king 
named John.
(c) There has been a king named John because there has been a 
king named John.
From all of these statements above, it is evident that there is a level of 
analysis. The statements does not require being analytic to establish the 
necessitation of a truthmaker that has the possibility of change, as Tallant 
and Ingram argue. However, proceeding to give a worthwhile presentist 
translation, nefarious or not, requires that the past tense quantification be 
somewhat explicated. 
In (a) above, the span operator “it has been that,” is used to explicate 
the temporal ontology of the original statement. In contrast, the statement 
is substantially given by the presentist’s restricted quantification. The 
translation (b) is somewhat primitive but not un-analyzable, and this is due 
to the tense operator “there has been” is summarily implied in “there was.” 
This translation does not necessarily include a truthmaker and it does have 
an indication of being trivial. I am of the view that the tense operator “there 
was” can be further analyzed in a way that the tense operator captures the 
temporal location of the event.
Tallant and Ingram’s view will (for consistency) align with (c), which is 
presented in a primitive un-analyzable way and which presents not only an 
unambitious move for the nefarious presentists. but also one belaboured 
with ambiguity and triviality. The span operator denotes a time interval that 
most certainly includes the unrestricted domain of quantification. To admit 
this for the nefarious presentist will be to deny also the restricted domain 
of quantification. It can be rightly deduced that nefarious presentism will 
hold on to an analysis of substantival ontology in its proposal to deal with 
quantification. 
34 Ibid. 
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According to the substantivalist theory of time, events and 
things “are located at” or “occur at” different instants of time 
and these instants are seen as being independent of the events 
or things they “contain.” Time is then a substance composed of 
such instants. It is thus easy for this view to account for periods 
of time without change, that is, for periods where all change 
stops and the universe is “frozen” during a certain interval of 
time since instants are not dependent on the changes that occur 
at them. Similarly, the view is also typically taken to be able to 
accommodate periods of “empty time,” that is, periods where 
no events occur at all. Metaphorically, time is here conceived 
of as a container that can contain events and things, but that is 
capable of not containing anything.35
The above conception of time is consistent with the nefarious presentists’ view 
of spatio-temporal ontology as not admitting of distributional properties. In 
other words, events are fixed in the spatio-temporal location in which they 
occur, and this suffices to explain the truth of past events at the time of 
utterance, that is, in the present. Furthermore, Jiri Benovsky claims that,
[…] instants are primitively numerically distinct entities that do 
not require to be distinguished qualitatively (since, in the first 
place, they do not have a qualitative nature such that they could 
be distinguished in a qualitative way). Metaphorically speaking, 
instants are containers that are in themselves qualitatively 
indistinguishable and that, during a global freeze, contain 
qualitatively indistinguishable stuff, but that are primitively 
numerically distinct. Instants conceived of in such a way are 
what I will call ‘‘problem-solvers.’’ In short, a problem-solver is a 
primitive of a theory that allows us to solve a problem. In general, 
it is probably the case that all primitives are, at least to some 
extent, problem-solvers, for primitives, are typically introduced 
in any theory to do an explanatory job that they manage to 
do by having the primitive capacity to do so. In the case of 
substantivalism, how can the theory account for the possibility 
of periods of time without change? By using its primitive notion 
of instants that are qualitatively indistinguishable but that are 
primitively numerically distinct. This premise is thus a ‘‘problem-
35 Benovsky, 104.
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solver’’ since without appealing to it the theory would not be 
able to accommodate the possibility of global freezes and since 
it succeeds to achieve its end only in virtue of the postulation 
that it can do so. It may seem from what I just said that I take 
substantivalism to be an unappealing view that does not know 
better than primitively postulating solutions to its theoretical 
challenges. But this is not so: every theory has its primitives […] 
and every theory has the right to do so since without the use of 
such problem solvers we would not be able to get very far in the 
construction of metaphysical theories […].36
This view of primitives that were expressed by Benovsky captures the focus 
of nefarious presentism in turning to un-analyzable truths of a past event 
(understood to be qualitatively indistinguishable instants of time described 
above). These instants of time, especially in the case of plural tensed 
quantification, are qualitatively indistinguishable because of the nature of 
fixing earlier discussed. For a proposition such as, “There have been five 
kings named Charles,” as at the time of utterance, the instants of time for 
the temporal distribution is qualitatively absent or indistinguishable since 
no truthmaker(s) will ever be alluded to for the truth of the statement. This 
need not be of any ontological commitment to the truth of the statement, 
since the quantification is understood as indistinguishable in its temporal 
location This view tends to be consistent with what Ingram calls a “thisness 
ontology.”37 Ingram defines the notion of thisness as follows: 
it is a particular, primitive, purely non-qualitative property of 
an object; the property of being a certain object. For a given 
x, x’s thisness is the property being-x or being-identical-with-x. 
For example, Barack Obama’s “thisness” is the property being-
identical-with-Obama. This basic idea can be sketched in various 
ways, but my concern is to develop a notion of “thisness” that 
will vindicate presentism.38
Making an assumption of the property of an object for Ingram is somewhat 
dependent on the spatio-temporality of an object. But the notion of 
thisness goes beyond the truthmaker’s condition to establishing the state of 
affairs. This notion of Ingram’s in order to vindicate presentism (nefarious) 
36 Ibid. 
37 David Ingram, “Thisnesses, Propositions and Truth,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99, no. 
3 (2016): 2.
38 Ibid., 3-4.
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is clearly shifting ground from the non-commitment to ontology of 
nefarious presentism. The property being-x or being-identical-with-x, can be 
distinguished as an ontological category. The thisness of an object being 
described as primitive and purely non-qualitative can be regarded as implying 
that the property of the object is fixed. As such, the nature of fixing that 
Tallant and Ingram argue for plays out in the thisness of the present. 
(a) The Nature of a Thisness – every object instantiates a thisness; 
a thisness is a particular, primitive, purely non-qualitative 
property of an object. 
(b) The Life of a Thisness – a thisness T comes into being with an 
object x, T is uniquely instantiated by x throughout x’s existence, 
and T continues to exist uninstantiated when x has ceased to 
exist. 
(c) The Character of a Thisness – a thisness T instantiates higher-
order properties, which characterizes the object that instantiates 
T, x; the relevant properties of T initially correspond to the 
lower-order properties of x.39
From the above, the thisness of an object continues to exist even when the 
truthmaker of the object is no longer present. This is a quite ambivalent 
position to hold for a nefarious presentist, and as such the coherence of 
the principles (un-analysability, non-qualitativeness) of the notion of 
primitivism is questionable as the nature, life and character of the thisness 
as a property of an object do not solve the truthmaker problem pointedly. 
How is thisness so different from the temporal distributional properties that 
Cameron suggests? Phil Corkum notes that Tallant and Ingram are caught 
into the web of temporal extension beyond the present and the legitimacy of 
the acceptance or denial of this extension is yet to be sufficiently answered 
by these scholars. 
Tallant and Ingram thus take the distributionalist to be caught 
in an inconsistency: temporal distributions require extensions of 
time, but presentists must deny that there are such extensions.40
Contrariwise, the idea of thisness as a property of objects in spatio-temporal 
ontology as Ingram put forward seems to reintroduce the idea of distributional 
property into presentism. How can we possibly describe properties (as a 
39 Ibid., 5.
40 Phil Corkum, “Presentism, Truthmakers and Distributional Properties,” Synthese 191 (2014): 
3433.
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distribution or thisness)? Corkum discusses the legitimacy of reference to 
temporal distributional properties a truthmakers: 
Are temporal distributional properties legitimate truthmakers? 
Under what conditions do such properties conform to the 
prohibition against cheating? […] temporal distributional 
properties meet this requirement just in case they are not reducible 
to non-distributional or uniformly distributional properties. For 
readability, let me say that temporal distributional properties are 
reducible or irreducible, and leave the reference to that to which 
they are or are not reducible, non-distributional or uniformly 
distributional properties, tacit.41
Corkum’s argument above also suggests the un-analyzability of the present, 
even with the distribution of properties as the attempt by Ingram to use 
thisness does little to address the analysis of the present without the 
distribution of properties of the object beyond the present. Hence, the 
presentist claims about the spatio-temporal location of an object when 
the truthmaker is no longer in the present can well be acknowledged. This 
move towards primitivism by nefarious presentists also faces the problems 
of semantics and inference, as indicated by Lewis. However, with the notion 
of thisness and distribution of property, once an object instantiates the 
property in existence, it addresses the tensed quantification in the domain 
of entities under semantics and also the quantifier phrases in inference. Even 
so, it may well attempt to reduce the demand of analyzing span operators, 
which, as Lewis argues, cannot be properly understood when they are un-
analyzed.
If nefarious presentism admits that objects which are into the spatio-
temporal location have properties and that there is a nature of fixing on 
those properties which are un-analyzable without losing their spatio-
temporal location, then the burden of triviality is also on the nefarious 
presentist, if an attempt of explication is made. The statement “There was 
a king named Charles in Britain” will be accepted by nefarious presentists 
not due to its ontological commitment to a truthmaker that supervenes on 
the beingness of a state of affairs, but due to the spatio-temporal location 
which is a present T1, when it did exist that “There is a king named Charles.” 
The properties of the entity are regarded as distributed over time, as the 
present is no longer existing in its spatio-temporal occurrence, and by 
implication for the nefarious presentist it is un-analyzable. 
41 Corkum, 3434.
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IV. Conclusion
The nefarious presentist successfully avoids to analyze these statements 
about the present. The primitive, in this case, will be either tensed or tenseless 
quantifiers, span operators, in singular or plural quantification. Tallant also 
notes that the nefarious presentists’ position allows them to be described as 
“cheats” without an ontological commitment,42 and they claim to provide a 
sufficient presentist view on the un-analyzability of the present. Benovsky also 
makes the claim that primitives in a way cut off the discourse on a topic too 
soon for a conclusion.43 If an object or property or word can be considered 
as un-analyzable, the need to provide further explication on the proposer is 
somewhat reduced. This is expressly shown in the following example:
nefarious cheats (like Tallant) will say “it was the case that p” is 
true because it was the case that p’. Here, the “was” is primitive 
and unanalyzable. Notice, also, that Tallant will agree that this 
“was” does not help us to pick out any ontology; it does not help 
us to speak of any distinctive metaphysical category or kind.44
The un-analyzability of the tense operator ‘was’ will inevitably lead to the 
problem of triviality, if the distribution of properties over spatio-temporal 
locations is admitted by the nefarious presentist, even in the mildest sense. as 
it is evident in the notion of thisness, that Ingram suggests, or in virtue of a 
property having existed, as Tallant suggests.45 It is quite evident that although 
nefarious presentists claim that their view does not pick out any ontology, 
the insistence on this claim will end up being a self-defeating one. A tense 
operator applies to a thing, either concept or object, and the existence of it, 
even of the Menoingian kind can be inferred. Hence the nefarious presentists 
will face the challenge of triviality of truth in their claim of un-analyzability.
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